The battle for the narrative of Russo-Ukrainian war one year in: Part 2 (Russia)
How the bear perceived events along it's Western border, while confronting realism of US
More than a year has passed since Russia invaded Ukraine, and we keep going back-and-forth between cliched narratives of Russian imperialism or NATO expansion. In my first part of revisiting the narrative one-year in, I took a deep-dive at what was going on inside Ukraine, the fault lines which existed and how they intensified facing challenges in 2004 and an irreversible major change in 2014.
Here I would investigate the Russian perspective as the events unfolded, not just in Ukraine but also neighboring countries and US. The aim here is not justify this perspective, but understand the forces in action which culminated in the events of 2022 February. I will explore in 4 dimensions:
Imperialist/ paternalistic chauvinistic overtones towards former Soviet states: It’s irresponsible to not consider the Russian desires to maintain a sphere-of-influence even as those countries wish otherwise, and especially in the case of Ukraine and Belarus continued insistence of being one people.
Bilateral territorial and economic disputes escalating: Even before 2014 Euromaidan, relations between Russia and Ukraine faced a lot of challenges especially regarding the status of Crimea, Black Sea Fleet and trade issues especially around Russia serving gas to Europe with Ukraine as transit country.
Semblance of concern for Russian-speaking nationals elsewhere: While “humanitarian intervention” is an overused and abused playbook, its worth examining while admitting this is more of a pretext than major cause.
Heightened levels of threat by NATO containment destabilizing it’s own backyard: While a lot has been spoken on NATO expansion, its absolutely essential to see the history of NATO-Russia relation after 1991, which started with a lot of promise just to degenerate over the years with fears of unilateral invasions, interference in domestic processes and expansion by NATO leading to a replay of Cold War.
I will explore the period after 1991 mostly, and use some writings by Putin himself as a lot has been voiced- legitimate concerns and imperial tendencies.
Dissolution of Soviet and Russian paternalism
Therefore, modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era. We know and remember well that it was shaped – for a significant part – on the lands of historical Russia. To make sure of that, it is enough to look at the boundaries of the lands reunited with the Russian state in the 17th century and the territory of the Ukrainian SSR when it left the Soviet Union…It is no longer important what exactly the idea of the Bolshevik leaders who were chopping the country into pieces was. We can disagree about minor details, background and logics behind certain decisions. One fact is crystal clear: Russia was robbed, indeed. - On the History of Russia and Ukraine
While it’s easy to nitpick and point to passages like this to show Putin denies Ukrainians any agency, and to suggest he wants to colonize all of Europe, I wanted to explore genuine undercurrents in Russian society where arguments around Russian identity and it’s historic role to Ukrainian and Belarussian identities is prominent. One of the core tenets here is the concept of “Russian World” which is meant to encompass the unified idea of Russian people across the world, primarily through Russian language, with Moscow as political capital, Kyiv as cultural capital and Russian Orthodox Church as common religion. In fact, Putin goes to a lot of detail explaining how Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians are identical people with shared roots, who over the past few centuries have developed different identities. The Kiril Patriarch of Moscow (similar to Pope) describe Russian world as:
the common civilizational space founded on three pillars: Eastern Orthodoxy, Russian culture and especially the language and the common historical memory and connected with its common vision on the further social development"
One of the ways Russia has promoted this concept has been through Rusky Mir Foundation- a government sponsored organization founded in 2007 to promote the concept of Russian World globally, especially among Russian speakers.
Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic…. were bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and – after the baptism of Rus – the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St. Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines our affinity today. - On the History of Russia and Ukraine
Another similar concept which has enchanted Russian scholars, academics and politics is that of “Russian Idea”- along the lines of “God’s plan for Russia” : Russian version of American exceptionalism or Manifest Destiny to use a historical reference. The most prominent effort amongst nationalists is the concept of “Triune Russian nation” with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus forming three sub-nations within the common Russian nation, joined by a shared history and divided by invaders amongst them the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in more recent times- the United States. While there is more context to filter through, it’s inevitable to consider the dimension of continuing to think of Ukraine as an extension of Russia, if not physically then culturally, and how this might impact the decisions to invade Ukraine. As voiced by ex-Ukrainian President Yushchenko:
“if Ukrainians and the Russians are one people, it means Ukrainian people do not exist”
Image: Triune Russian Nation imagery from times of Russian Empire
On a more practical note, there are few ways this “shared” identity and the desire for “Russian world” has manifested itself since the dissolution of Soviet Union (arguably itself a massive imperial project which among other territories re-absorbed Ukraine).
While the majority of independence declarations from Soviet went smoothly, there were few divisions which didn’t go as smoothly- mostly in countries with Russia or Russia-allied minorities opposing the new nationalist linguistic laws. When tensions increased, breakaway territories declared independence, Russia did intervene (although unofficially) especially in Transnistria War (against Moldova) and South Ossetia War (against Georgia) leading to breakaway republics being successfully formed. Similar concerns were raised with Ukraine regarding Crimea. This asserted Russia’s goal in setting itself as a willing “defender” for the rights of Russian-speaking ethnic minorities in nearby nations.
Ukraine alongside Russia and Belarus formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (similar to British Commonwealth) at Belovezha Accords, which 8 other countries successively joined. Thus Ukraine continued to be one of the closest members and core part of Russian axis, centered around political, cultural similarities and economic free-trade opportunities.
It’s important to note that in both the above points, that Russia used it’s intervention in the above wars and creation of a mutually beneficial organization with itself as the leader as a continued attempt to have a sphere of influence- something which can be concluded as a paternalistic approach to it’s neighbors in favor of it’s own interests.
In the specific context of the Russo-Ukraine War, while Putin has spoken a lot in the essay and his speech “on conducting a special military operation” where he genuinely focuses a lot on the shared history of the three nations, there are more sinister articles published in Russian nationalist circles recently where there have been calls for complete defeat, destruction and disintegration of the Ukrainian state and national identity. While one can sideline the author as an independent actor (though he is very well-connected and has helped with the election of Russian and Ukrainian leaders), Dmitri Medvedev (ex-President & PM, and now Deputy Chair of Russian Security Council) himself has been vocal diminishing the status of Ukraine. which gives more credence to the imperial school of thought, which refuses to identify Ukrainian identity as independent and thus is comfortable with it’s destruction.
The bilateral disputes with Ukraine: Gas & Crimea
It’s important to not ignore the core disputes between the two nations which were occurring in the aftermath of dissolution of Soviet Union. While Ukraine was relatively friendly after 1991, there were tensions escalating between the two countries on issues other than it’s entry into EU/NATO. At the center of the issues was the status of Crimea, the province which was an independent republic in Soviet Union until it was made a part of Ukraine in 1954. What made the issue very crucial for Russia apart for it being a majority ethnic Russian province is the location of Sevastopol in Crimea, which is the home of the historic Black Sea Fleet- one of Russian navy’s major fleets from 1783 regarding which many historic wars including Crimean War were fought. The other major issue was around gas disputes with Russia as supplier for gas to Europe, and Ukraine as a transit nation.
Majority of the events described below focus on the time before 2014, as since then the Donbas War has been ongoing and has been the focal point of all disputes.
The issue of Crimea and Sevastopol
Apart from the historic part of Crimean transfer, a lot of tensions happened in the early years after Soviet dissolution. Crimea voted in a referendum in 1991 on re-establishing itself as an independent Soviet Republic and it overwhelmingly succeeded. However when Soviet Union dissolved few months later, Crimea just went de-facto to Ukraine. In 1992, this led to an establishment of Republic of Crimea with it’s own Parliament , President and a new constitution. When the Crimean Parliament declared independence on 5 May 1992, it was initially not recognized by Ukraine and later constitution was amended to state Crimea was a part of Ukraine, while getting concessions such as being recognized as an autonomous republic with special economic status. While Russia also claimed Crimea, after 1993 Constitutional Crisis in Russia Yeltsin refused to meet with the Crimean President, rather signing a memorandum with US/UK to recognize the existing borders of Ukraine (including Crimea) in exchange of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan alongside guaranteeing them not being threatened military or economically (sanctions). However within Crimea, in Yury Meshkov won the 1994 elections-wanting to merge with Russia and restored original 1992 constitution as a result of another referendum in 1994 seeking more autonomy and Crimeans getting dual Russian and Ukrainian passports. As tensions ratcheted up between the Central Ukrainian government and Meshkov (due to his increased “separatism”, status of Russian language and corruption), the government moved in with tanks in early 1995 to arrest Meshkov, abolish the constitution of Crimea, the office of President and brought Crimea under central rule. This was met by strong condemnation from Russia calling it a violation of autonomy guarantees of Budapest Memorandum, passing a resolution in Russian parliament in condemnation and foreign minister threatening sanctions for the “rights of Russian speakers and Crimean autonomy”.
However tensions reduced after the signing of the Friendship Treaty between the two countries to identify the current borders. Moreover a historic treaty was signed to partition Black Sea Fleet (81% Russian, 19% Ukrainian) where Russia could continue to use it’s naval fleet with Ukraine leasing it out in 10-year increments. While that eased tensions between the countries and Crimea was able to adopt a new constitution again and be recognized as an autonomous republic in 1998, tensions continued flaring up. Notable escalations were 2006 anti-NATO protests over a joint military exercise of US with Ukraine in Crimea. Such exercises continued despite resistance by Crimeans and Russians every year till 2014. Importantly under President Yanyukovych, a 25-year lease extension to Russia for Black Sea Fleet was signed by Ukraine. However with the 2014 overthrow of Yanyukovych by pro-EU faction, Crimea had several protests and it was followed with declaration of independence and annexation.
Image: Russian flags being waived in Crimea, 2008
Oil and gas
Territory and geography weren’t the only issues of dispute- but also economic. Russia’s gas exports to Western Europe was one of it’s primary revenue sources, and majority of the pipelines went through Ukrainian territory. The crux of the disagreements were transit fees Russia paid to Ukraine for using it’s soil with Russia accusing Ukraine of charging too much & Ukraine accusing Russia of not paying enough. Moreover Russia was primarily supplier of Ukraine’s energy needs, and blame games circulated around outstanding debts owed by Ukraine for it’s own imports. In 2005, situation escalated with Russia accusing Ukraine of stealing gas meant for Europe- which after initial denial, they admitted due to harsh winter- and cutting off all gas supplies. After some temporary settlements, situation worsened in 2009 when Gazprom (Russian state-owned gas company) cut supplies for 13 days over the debt settlements with Naftogaz (Ukrainian state-owned gas company) affecting all of south-Eastern Europe. The continued altercations led to accusations where Ukraine felt Russia used it’s gas supplies and Russia felt Ukraine used it’s transit routes as tools for political leverage This led to Russia’s dual strategy of commissioning Nordstream Pipelines going through the North directly to Germany, while South Stream pipelines (didn’t end up getting approved by EU) which would circumvent Ukraine to provide energy directly to South Europe. This caused a lot of consternation in Ukraine as it would lose a core source of revenue from transit fees thus weakening it’s economy further.
Image: Gas pipelines from Russia to Western Europe, with Ukraine as transit country
Semblance of concern for Russian-speaking nationals, and their second-class treatment in other countries
For eight years, for eight endless years we have been doing everything possible to settle the situation by peaceful political means. Everything was in vain... The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime.
-Where have you been 8 years? (part of speech while launching offensive)
Now I will address the point which I mostly am dismissive of personally, but want to investigate just out of taking the aggressor at face-value. The reason for skepticism is simple- nation states aren’t moral creatures for the most part, and don’t spend billions of dollars and thousands of lives out of some moral quest. Reasons are mostly geopolitical and national interests related. However within the moral framework where humanitarian interventions are often quoted as the reason for countless regime change operations, and responsibility to protect has been enshrined- I would extend a similar framework to this war too. After all, given the ethno-nationalist characteristic of Russia described, it wouldn’t be completely surprising that there is some non-zero concern about rights of ethnic Russians elsewhere (more than US’s concern of women in Afghanistan or Kurds in Iraq).
The anti-Russia project has been rejected by millions of Ukrainians. The people of Crimea and residents of Sevastopol made their historic choice. And people in the southeast peacefully tried to defend their stance. Yet, all of them, including children, were labeled as separatists and terrorists. They were threatened with ethnic cleansing and the use of military force. And the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk took up arms to defend their home, their language and their lives. Were they left any other choice after the riots that swept through the cities of Ukraine, after the horror and tragedy of 2 May 2014 in Odessa where Ukrainian neo-Nazis burned people alive making a new Khatyn out of it? The same massacre was ready to be carried out by the followers of Bandera in Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk and Lugansk. Even now they do not abandon such plans. They are biding their time. But their time will not come. - On the History of Russia and Ukraine
I wouldn’t repeat the aggressive nationalist and linguistic laws slowly chipping away at the rights of ethnic Russians which came in the wake of Poroshenko government.
A good follow-up question would be: if the Russian government legitimately cared about these ethnic Russian civilians in Eastern Ukraine, did they do anything for them prior to 2022 invasion, apart from militarily funding them. Turns out- yes. All the negotiations around Minsk agreements had strong provisions for increased autonomy for Donbas provinces, with linguistic rights enshrined. In UN, they proposed bills- one was to “combat glorification of Nazism” as well as multiple resolutions to enforce Minsk agreements. There were discussions to legitimize providing Russian passports to Donbas residents. Indeed, Russia did provide a lot of passports to these people allowing them a chance at recognition as a Russian citizen. Moreover beyond theatrics, Russia had a huge influx of refugees from Eastern Ukraine, starting in 2014 itself after Euromaidan. In fact the refugees have continued trickling even after their invasion, and Russia still has the highest number of Ukrainian refugees. Refugees and Donbas residents who were issued Russian citizenship are even able to vote in Russian parliamentary elections- thus providing equal rights. So it would be correct to say the plight of these people was being recognized, and efforts to rehabilitate them in Russian society underway.
Image: Even after 2022 invasion, Russia had most migrations after Poland
And while it’s reasonable to assume this was just to use them as pawns, the demand for DPR and LPR independence recognition wasn’t made until 2 days before invasion. This came after Ukraine state officials refused to provide special status as per Minsk agreements, and LPR/DPR leaders asked for assistance. When they did recognize the independence, they made sure to point out mass graves which were found in Donbas. Thus while it is completely legitimate to believe that humanitarian concerns took a backseat to other concerns, it is not legitimate to ignore the actual atrocities happening in Eastern Ukraine, and neither to deny the playbook being used here is one which has been perfected by Western powers to justify every regime change operation in the last 70+ years.
Image: refugees from Ukraine at Russian border in 2014
Heightened levels of threat from NATO
I recall that long ago, well before 2014, the U.S. and EU countries systematically and consistently pushed Ukraine to curtail and limit economic cooperation with Russia. We, as the largest trade and economic partner of Ukraine, suggested discussing the emerging problems in the Ukraine-Russia-EU format. But every time we were told that Russia had nothing to do with it and that the issue concerned only the EU and Ukraine. De facto Western countries rejected Russia's repeated calls for dialogue.
While a lot of these issues above continued to intensify and formed the backbone of bilateral mistrust, the situation wouldn’t still have escalated into a full-scale invasion if not for perception of Ukraine becoming an anti-Russia NATO vassal on it’s border. After all, Ukraine can do only so much harm and sanctions/ economic weaponization of gas would have given Russia the outcome they wanted- whether it was a subjugated and compliant Ukraine, one which was forced to treat ethnic Russians better. However that is not true when it is backed by the world’s largest economic superpower, and moreover world’s strongest military alliance. Moreover the trajectory of this alliance seemed to be trending over years slowly inching to their borders either by the county’s choice, or with color revolutions. Combined with the above reasons, that was the final straw realizing their historic oldest partner, one part of their “triune nation”, home to the largest ethnic Russian population outside Russia was now not just actively hostile to them, but it was doing so backed by a much stronger power, who had shown a penchant for hostility to them.
Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. Inevitably, there came a time when the concept of ”Ukraine is not Russia“ was no longer an option. There was a need for the ”anti-Russia“ concept which we will never accept.
All the subterfuges associated with the anti-Russia project are clear to us. And we will never allow our historical territories and people close to us living there to be used against Russia. And to those who will undertake such an attempt, I would like to say that this way they will destroy their own country.
So why did relations between Russia and NATO get to where they are now? Was it always the same? What was Ukraine’s own aspirations with NATO? The story is too deep, andUS perspective is covered in next post. Here, I will start by bringing more context to NATO-Russia relation: how it started after the dissolution of Soviet Union and how it deteriorated.
NATO and Russia: The good start
Indeed under Yeltsin, it was a good start- he was very enthusiastic about pursuing active alignment with the West and expressed desire for Russia itself to join NATO. Multiple treaties were signed, including creating Partnership for Peace and other historic ones like Budapest Memorandum (to denuclearize Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan), withdrawing Russian troops from Baltic states. As part of Partnership of Peace, he even agreed to include it to all other Eastern European nations including eventual NATO admission as long as it included Russia. Another important gesture for partnership was joining UN peacekeeping troops and providing humanitarian aid in Bosnian War and supporting UN resolutions for possible use of force to show Russia’s co-operation with West despite domestic objections. Bill Clinton even helped Boris Yeltsin win the 1996 election. Efforts were made to make agreements between Russia/NATO on creating a new “NATO-Russia Founding Act” including the formation of Permanent Joint Council to cooperate, share information, exchange of military personnel. Even after the relation started down-sliding in successive years (see below), Vladimir Putin said this in 2000 just prior to taking office:
“Russia is part of European culture. And I cannot imagine my own country in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilized world. So it is hard for me to visualise NATO as an enemy…. Russia strives for equitable and candid relations with its partners. The main problem here lies in attempts to discard previously agreed common decision-making instruments –primarily as regards international security… We believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner. You are aware we have been constantly voicing our opposition to NATO's eastward enlargement.” - Putin’s interview with BBC
Moreover after 9/11 attacks, there was a moment of co-operation where Putin showed support to US, helped with UN resolutions on Afghanistan and collaborated in the war on terror in the new NATO-Russia Council as Russia was also fighting al-Qaeda in Chechnya. However that might have been one of the last positive signs till Obama’s term when there was a temporary reset and cooperated temporarily in Syria. This was unfortunately a blip in otherwise downward spiral.
The decline of the bonhomie: hostility and enemies again
Russia wanted to be NATO member, yet it didn’t pan out. Let’s explore reasons from a Russian perspective (explore from US perspective in the next post):
NATO unilateral invasions and abrogations since 1991: While Russia had sought to be an equal partner in decision-making, and thought there was a possibility of “collective security” principles to prevail, they would be soon disappointed by being relegated and seeing a lot of unilateral invasions by NATO/US. First challenge was in Bosnia itself- where despite providing peacekeeping forces and nominal support for UN resolutions with some concerns on not wanting to use force- NATO over-stepped the goals by unilaterally bombing Spraska- an autonomous Serbian separatist area trying to gain independence from Bosnia. However while this caused some consternation, it was very different and met with fury when NATO decided to unilaterally proceed with bombing Yugoslavia for 78 days in 1999- this time without a UN mandate over the objections of China and Russia. The stated objective was “prevent genocide of Kosovan Albanians”- a separatist faction trying to gain independence from Serbia. However given in both instances NATO chose to bomb Serbs- traditional allies of Russia- when they were separatists and when they were fighting separatists, seemed to indicate to Russians that purported claims of of humanitarian intervention were being applied selectively to increase influence and weaken opponents, and heightened anxieties about how ongoing NATO expansion could be used against Russia and Russian minorities in nearby countries.
Image: NATO bombing of Yugoslavia- one of the bloodiest wars in Europe since WW2
While US/NATO invading countries unilaterally was a concern, tensions really escalated when US unilaterally withdrew from Anti-Balistic Missile Treaty in 2002 (signed in 1972) under the stated reason of “threat from Iran”, thus also invalidating Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - leading to Putin’s own nuclear build-up. Any lasting hope Russia had on being considered an “equal partner” when it came to decision-making for invasions was shattered when US invaded Iraq (2003) without UN mandate over objections of Russia, China and France. Moreover in 2008, US and European nations unilaterally recognized the independence of Kosovo (from Serbia) over objections by Russia and many other countries, including some in Europe for creating a new precedent. Russia asserted itself soon after using the same precedent to intervene in Georgia militarily after Georgian government sent troops to quash dissent, and moreover used Kosovo precedent to identify independence for South Ossetia and Azbakia. Finally in 2011 despite supposed reset of relations after Obama, NATO’s unilateral invasion of Libya to force regime change under R2P principle and then running covert operation in Syria funneling money to overthrow of Bashar al-Assad- Russia’s last ally in Middle East- while in there to fight ISIS convinced Russia of NATO’s imperial aims.Interference in Russia and color revolutions: While unilateral invasions in far away countries, including Russian allies (Serbia, Syria) was source of frustration, what was concerned much more existential was perceived US interference in Russian domestic affairs, and “color revolutions” in nearby countries including Ukraine to install anti-Russia governments. Domestically Russia fought two battles with Chechnya- first in 1994, and second time in 1999 (as a result of apartment bombings across Russia, and invasion of Dagestan)- leading to a long protracted conflict with civilian casualties. Clinton’s criticism of “human right violations” within months of bombing Yugoslavia was met with intense criticism and surge in tensions by Yelstin. While US had propped Yeltsin to victory in 1996, when Putin won re-election in 2004 US intervened calling them “not free and fair”- setting a trend for criticizing every successive election including allegations by Russia of inciting and funding 2011-13 protests.
Apart from criticizing Russia’s internal affairs with possibly backing internal conflict, there was a lot more success in toppling governments nearby. After Serbian government was toppled in 2000 with US help, the same template and funding was successfully applied in Georgia in 2003 under “Rose Revolution” to overthrow Eduard Shevardnadze- who was domestically considered corrupt- by pro-EU protesters, but had significant US-funding including by NGOs backed by State Dept and Open Societies Foundation (by Soros). This was very unsettling to Russia as Shevardnadze- while no friend of Russia- was a Soviet-era leader and more willing to engage constructively with Russia than his successor Saakashvili who was perceived as more anti-Russia especially with his policies in South Ossetia/Azbakia. A similar template was tried in Belarus- Russia’s closest allies and part of “triune nation”- by US to fund and overthrow Lukashenko although that was unsuccessful. While all the other cases involved Soviet-era leaders being toppled, what was seen as direct meddling to undermine and contain Russia was “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine- where prominent US politicians interfered explicitly to undermine the election, and provided funding- to overturn results of democratic elections where a pro-Russia leader was elected. While the election results did change leading to a strong anti-Russian period in Ukraine, when Yanyukovych was elected in 2010, he was toppled by pro-EU protesters- again with overt support of US politicians.NATO expansion to the borders: While Yeltsin wasn’t opposed to NATO expanding, he considered Russia to be integral part of it. Clinton assured him to not expand NATO before his election, but immediately after that admitted the Visegrad group of countries in NATO over Russia’s objections at 1997 Madrid Summit. Moreover it laid groundwork for admitting next set of countries by 1999. As these continued to exclude Russia (Putin explicitly asked ‘When are you going to invite us to join Nato?’) alongside unilateral invasions, Russia was more convinced this was the next chapter of containment politics. The NATO accession of Vilnius Group inviting 7 new countries happened in 2004, including Baltic States. It’s worth noting that countries being admitted were very interested in joining NATO themselves. The Russian concern came from a mixture of wanting to retain a “historic sphere of influence” and not wanting to have Western troops moving closer to it. Since then, major tensions included US plans to install anti-ballistic missiles in Poland & Czech , and soon after in the 20th NATO Summit (Bucharest Summit) apart from including Croatia and Albania into NATO also included US President George W Bush promising NATO entry for Ukraine & Georgia to resistance from some European powers such as France, Germany, Netherlands and definitely stiff resistance from Russia. In President Medvedev’s words:
no country would be happy about a military bloc to which it did not belong approaching its borders
Image: NATO accession by year
So take the mixture of above, and you have a powerful military alliance inching closer to your borders, installing missiles in them (including by unilaterally withdrawing from Soviet era non-proliferation treaties) and when there are some countries where this doesn’t work organically, fund opposition parties and protesters to overthrow their governments, and even try to influence elections within Russia itself. Moreover this alliance has demonstrated again-and-again it’s willing to use its military power to resolve conflicts, despite objections of other UNSC members and whether your concern is national security, preventing your country from being Balkanized, or some legitimate concern of ethnic Russians things look more dire. Thus when 2014 Euromaidan overthrow happened, Russia felt it was the final chapter rather than let NATO define the trajectory and started funding rebels after intervening in Georgia in 2008 and annexing Crimea. However a lot happened in the final years.
What did Ukraine want?
Meanwhile while Ukraine had been seeking entry into EU from early 90s itself, joining NATO wasn’t a priority and rather military neutrality was emphasized in the Constitution. Some saber-rattling regarding status of Sevastapool in 1997 was the first time Ukraine proposed a Special partnership with NATO. Efforts escalated following Orange Revolution and the pro-EU President in 2005, including applying to Bush in Bucharest Summit for Membership Agreement Plan in 2008. While this led to worsening relations with Russia, the election of Yanyukovych in 2010 extinguished NATO ambitions as apart from some joint-exercises, NATO membership was put off the table in favor of neutrality. EU accession was still a priority, until he backtracked off the agreement setting in motion a set of events leading to Euromaidan protests and his overthrow. It is worth noting that though Presidents had expressed desire to join NATO, prior to 2014 the majority of Ukrainian public consistently opposed joining NATO, but since the onset of civil war things changed significantly.
The Final Chapter
The Western authors of the anti-Russia project set up the Ukrainian political system in such a way that presidents, members of parliament and ministers would change but the attitude of separation from and enmity with Russia would remain. Reaching peace was the main election slogan of the incumbent president. He came to power with this. The promises turned out to be lies. Nothing has changed. And in some ways the situation in Ukraine and around Donbas has even degenerated.
There is a before and after February 2014 Euromaidan overthrow to the entire Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and that holds true for Russia-NATO relations too. When Russia annexed Crimea and funded separatists in Donbas region, US sanctioned Russian officials, tried diplomatic isolation and passed multiple acts which appropriated upwards of $500 million to send security assistance to Ukraine. Under Obama administration, this included flooding Ukraine with anti-tank and anti-armor weapons, alongside other non-lethal weapons including body armor, heavy engineering equipment, thermal vision devices etc. However it wasn’t until 2017 under Trump administration when the war saw an escalation from US openly supplying lethal weapons including javelin anti-tank missiles, marking a major escalation and the trend continued with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, rocket launchers afterwards. The time under Trump administration was a fraught one- on one side, there was escalation with more lethal weapons being shipped to Ukraine, repealed INF treaty from 1987, placed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 under the shadow of “Russian interference in US” elections claim which authorized hybrid warfare just before Trump took office while on the other hand Trump was constantly undermining NATO’s role and even went so far as to freeze military funds to Ukraine.
Meanwhile at the same time, Ukrainian authorities under Poroshenko moved from enshrining neutrality in it’s constitution to advocating for NATO membership as a core military goal, and in 2018 amended the constitution to enshrine integration into NATO and EU as a priority. This was on top of ending treaties and military co-operation agreements with Russia. Apart from all the domestic Ukrainian policies, one major incident involved Russian FSB agents shooting Ukrainian naval vessels in 2018, in a first direct confrontation between countries. When Zelensky won in 2019, he continued pursuing NATO integration as a top priority.
Massive build-ups and escalation
For a detailed read on this section, I’d strongly recommend this article. One of the key drivers for the breaking of 2014-20 status quo (civil war with trying to enforce Minsk agreements) was the election of Joe Biden in US in Jan 2021. Not only did he signal undoing of Trump-era policies of undermining NATO, but Biden was also VP during 2014 coup and played a key role during the events and in post-Maidan presidency. He immediately passed aid packages to Ukraine starting with $125 million package in March itself, and intensified it with more packages with counter-drone, electronic warfare systems. As a response to this and Ukraine’s arrest of main pro-Russia opposition party leader, Russia started building up military capabilities at the border too. Around the same time, Zelensky declared “Crimea Platform” to regain Crimea by any means necessary. To counter Russia, UK joined US in the military buildup by helping Ukrainian naval capabilities and soon was followed by naval exercises in Black Sea with 32 other countries. These were followed with multiple defense treaties such as US-Ukraine Strategic Defense Framework and Charter on Strategic Partnership. In various forums, Putin started raising concerns with Angela Merkel, Joe Biden himself, meetings with heads of Greece, Hungary on the security concerns and heightened threat by turning Ukraine into a NATO:
“We are concerned over the prospects of Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO, as it will definitely result in the deployment of military contingents, bases and weapons posing a threat to us…Now we witness the missile defense systems in Poland and Romania,We have every reason to believe that the same will happen if Ukraine joins NATO, but on the Ukrainian soil. How can we not think about it, it would be a criminal omission from our side: witnessing impotently what happens”
Russian side requested in written security guarantees and submitted a written draft of their own to expedite a diplomatic resolution. To their chagrin, US replied within a month calling the point about Ukraine not being in NATO a non-starter. Moreover the Ukrainian security officials laid out in ambiguous terms that Minsk agreements could not be implemented especially with regards to autonomy for Donbas regions.
It is extremely alarming that elements of the US global defence system are being deployed near Russia. The Mk 41 launchers, which are located in Romania and are to be deployed in Poland, are adapted for launching the Tomahawk strike missiles. If this infrastructure continues to move forward, and if US and NATO missile systems are deployed in Ukraine, their flight time to Moscow will be only 7–10 minutes, or even five minutes for hypersonic systems. This is a huge challenge for us, for our security. -Internal meeting
Negotiations continued till a week or two before the actual invasion, with Putin speaking at lengths with Macron and Scholtz emphasizing that they were still open to not seeking independence for Donetsk and Luhansk despite Duma’s ask, and were willing to work in Minsk-style agreement.
It is written into Ukraine’s doctrines that it wants to take Crimea back, by force if necessary…This is written in their documents. Suppose it starts operations in Crimea, not to mention Donbass...Imagine that Ukraine is a NATO country and starts these military operations. What are we supposed to do? Fight against the NATO bloc? Has anyone given at least some thought to this? Apparently not…
The United States is not that concerned about Ukraine’s security. Its main goal is to contain Russia’s development. This is the whole point. In this sense, Ukraine is simply a tool to reach this goal.This can be done in different ways: by drawing us into some armed conflict, or compelling US allies in Europe to impose tough sanctions on us...or by drawing Ukraine into NATO, deploying attack weapons there and encouraging some Banderites to resolve the issues of Donbass or Crimea by force. —Discussion with Viktor Orban
The final impetus would have been a combination of Zelensky’s speech in Munich Conference where he suggested a desire for Ukraine to get nuclear weapons, and then a significant uptick in ceasefire violations along the border between Ukraine and Donetsk and Luhansk in the next few days. All these signaled together to the Russian parliament that no diplomatic solution was possible, in the sense West wasn’t simply interested and Ukraine had already converted into an anti-Russia state hostile to ethnic Russians, and the only way to prevent this from gaining more missiles on it’s borders was to attack Ukraine. And thus began the long, tortuous invasion with Putin’s (in)famous speech talking at length on a lot of the above points, and inflicting untold suffering in the course of next 1 year and ongoing.
Read the final post of the series understanding US motives here.
Great second article! Can't wait for the third!
Also, a small nit: s/it's/its/g
Fantastic work! This is best analysis of the causes leading up to the Russia-Ukraine war, that I have ever seen.
The links in it are also amazing — every one to an historic news item or wikipedia. Everyone should read this to understand what was happening. It matches exactly the picture I was uncovering, but goes much deeper than I ever discovered.
Highly recommend spending an hour on this to understand the conflict, and the role of NATO as well.
I would also like to add the following links to mainstream sources from 2014, which certainly affected events at the time:
https://www.pbs.org/video/frontline-battle-ukraine/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE6b4ao8gAQ
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/20/ukraine-widespread-use-cluster-munitions
And since:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_agreements#Minsk_II,_February_2015
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normandy_Format#2022
https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansion-into-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=KqE7UTptgGg